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Presencing As A Transformative Strategy For Changing Army Culture
Abstract
In order for leaders to be the most effective it is beneficial that they be self-aware. Part of being self-aware is to
understand how our own bias plays a part in how we frame, view or project information received or
transmitted to others. To enable participants of the Organization Dynamics program to become more self-
aware, for example, there are several different classes on leadership that use methods like the Hermann Brain
Dominance Instrument or the Enneagram. These techniques not only identify traits about ourselves to us,
they open the pathway to expanded thought and shift the view of our surroundings. I have used these
techniques, as well as my personal experience with mild Traumatic Brain Injury and Post Traumatic Stress to
examine organizational change within the United States Army in an attempt to demonstrate that the Army’s
premier program to help Soldiers deal with the stressors of multiple deployments to theaters of war is in
jeopardy. It is in jeopardy, I believe, due to the leaders’ lack of self-awareness and conscious understanding of
the context needed to support such significant shifts in organizational and individual mindsets and behavior.
As an analogous example of a major change process, in 2000, the Army embarked on a journey to transform
and chose as a symbol the wear of a black beret. In the course of a decade, the Army changed but did not
transform and in 2011 discarded that symbol of transformation. The failed attempt to transform is the result of
not changing the culture or the belief patterns that produce it and which it in turn cultivates. Soldiers and
leaders of today use the same thought processes as those of our predecessors, trapping us, and the
organization, in the past. To break this cycle I examine the theory of presencing as a way to break free from
processes of the past. Presencing allows leaders to use their self-awareness and trust of their inner feelings in
order to develop plans and policies for the future as it is emerging.
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In order for leaders to be the most effective it is beneficial that they be self-
aware.  Part of being self-aware is to understand how our own bias plays a part 
in how we frame, view or project information received or transmitted to others.  
To enable participants of the Organization Dynamics program to become more 
self-aware, for example, there are several different classes on leadership that 
use methods like the Hermann Brain Dominance Instrument or the Enneagram.  
These techniques not only identify traits about ourselves to us, they open the 
pathway to expanded thought and shift the view of our surroundings.  I have 
used these techniques, as well as my personal experience with mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury and Post Traumatic Stress to examine organizational change within 
the United States Army in an attempt to demonstrate that the Army’s premier 
program to help Soldiers deal with the stressors of multiple deployments to 
theaters of war is in jeopardy.  It is in jeopardy, I believe, due to the leaders’ lack 
of self-awareness and conscious understanding of the context needed to support 
such significant shifts in organizational and individual mindsets and behavior.  As 
an analogous example of a major change process, in 2000, the Army embarked 
on a journey to transform and chose as a symbol the wear of a black beret.  In 
the course of a decade, the Army changed but did not transform and in 2011 
discarded that symbol of transformation.  The failed attempt to transform is the 
result of not changing the culture or the belief patterns that produce it and which 
it in turn cultivates.  Soldiers and leaders of today use the same thought 
processes as those of our predecessors, trapping us, and the organization, in the 
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past.  To break this cycle I examine the theory of presencing as a way to break 
free from processes of the past.  Presencing allows leaders to use their self-
awareness and trust of their inner feelings in order to develop plans and policies 
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Background   Life, as I knew it, changed abruptly for me in the early morning hours of 
Saturday, February 19, 2009.  It was not the first significant change that I 
experienced in life, but in looking back, I think it one of the most humbling and 
enduring.  What caused my life to change that Saturday began two years earlier, 
during my second deployment to Afghanistan. 
 While on my second tour, from February 2006 through February 2007, I 
sustained repeated mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI) in the form of several mild 
concussions that at the time I did not think were significant.  I never lost 
consciousness; I just saw momentary blackness accompanied by stars and 
experienced ringing in my ears.  In soldier jargon, I had had my bell rung, 
repeatedly.  Having left these concussions untreated for a prolonged period I 
eventually developed Post Traumatic Stress (PTS)1
Over the course of the next two years I developed headaches, 
sleeplessness, light sensitivity, ringing in my ears, and was in a constant state of 
hyper-alertness.  I denied to my friends, my family, and myself for quite some 
time that I was in trouble and needed help.  As the headaches, light sensitivity 
and ringing in my ears began to worsen in the summer of 2008 I sought medical 
care for those symptoms. 
. 
                                                        
1 The American Psychiatric Association in their “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders” classifies post 
Traumatic Stress as a mental disorder. I consider PTS to be an injury and therefore refer to it as PTS and not PTSD. 
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 After several months of working my way through the managed care 
system, I arrived at the office of a neurologist in mid- December.  In a fifteen-
minute consultation, I had a diagnosis of migraines and two trial drugs to use.  I 
was to return in 30 days for a follow-up.  Upon my return in late January, I 
informed the doctor that neither of the drugs eased my symptoms.  He provided 
another, more potent, drug.  I was heading out of town on work so did not fill the 
prescription until my return. 
It was on day five of the drug therapy that my world as I knew it changed 
abruptly.  Some of what I know of that day I learned after being in therapy for a 
period and from conversation with those I interacted with that morning.  
Awakened before 4:00 o’clock on a Saturday morning and informed of a combat 
casualty in Iraq, my inner reality began to separate from the outer reality and the 
world of the present.  The initial caller, a Master Sergeant, told me that he had 
been alternately dialing my home telephone and government issued mobile 
phone for forty-five minutes before I answered.  When I did answer, he reported 
that I sounded disoriented and was mean.  He had the Chief of Staff, a Colonel, 
call me.  The Colonel told me I was abrasive and acting uncharacteristically.   
What I experienced between the first and second phone calls was a re-
vision of an ambush from 2006 in Afghanistan.  This was the first time this had 
ever happened to me.  My mind played the event in high definition reality; the 
sights, the sounds, the smells, the feelings that morning were to me as real as if I 
were experiencing them on that August day in 2006.  When the re-vision ended 
the hyper-vigilant state of combat that I entered into did not.  My mind’s inner 
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reality was beginning to deviate from the outer reality in which I lived and worked.  
By 8:00 o’clock in the morning my mind was no longer effectively cross 
lateralizing information between the hemispheres and while reporting to my boss, 
a General, via telephone I began to shake and sob uncontrollably.  Not much 
longer than an hour later, I was discussing with the General, in person, that I was 
committed to getting better and would seek treatment.  In the two years I had 
been home, this was the first time I had admitted to someone, or myself, that I 
had sustained an invisible injury and would require treatment from a mental 
health provider. 
Over the next eighteen months, I continued with therapy.  In June of 2009, 
after serving 24 years on an Active Guard Reserve tour of duty, I made the 
decision to retire from military service effective in November 2009.  I also entered 
the Masters of Science in Organizational Dynamics (MSOD) program at the 
University of Pennsylvania.  I originally was looking at a program in homeland 
security offered by another university.  A friend suggested that I look at Penn’s 
program and when I did, I knew it was for me.  I fully recognized that the military 
culture that I grew up in, and then lived in as an adult, was quite different from 
that of the rest of America.  I saw what the MSOD program at Penn offered as an 
opportunity for me to move beyond my comfort zone and explore leadership and 
behavior from a social science point of view.  As I look back I now realize that I 
was looking to change my lens -- I just did not realize it at the time. 
My experience in the MSOD program has been one of the most rewarding 
experiences in my life, second to none.  The faculty, staff, and my fellow students 
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all share the credit for this.  After notification I was accepted, I had a small 
amount of trepidation about how I would fit in.  My trepidation was short-lived as I 
immersed myself in the program and began my journey into concepts of 
organizational dynamics.  I began my studies on the processes on leadership, 
systems thinking, story telling, organizational and individual behavior and change 
management.  What I learned from all of this is that to be a more effective leader 
one must be self-aware and that context matters. 
The introduction to a greater understanding of my self-awareness began 
in Dynamics 501, with two exercises.  The first was when Dr. Janet Greco 
handed out a pair of glasses and instructed us to remove the lenses from them.  
“The remaining frame allowed for the metaphorical use of lenses to be tried out 
to help read organizations or behavior with differing mental models, assumptions 
or focus.  The idea was to create the objective recognition that we can change 
our perspectives intentionally; that we are always using some framework that is 
often invisibly directing or constricting our attention and not purposefully chosen 
for its applicable value in a given situation” (Greco, 2011) .  The second exercise 
was the Hermann Brain Dominance Instrument (HDBI).  The HBDI system uses 
a series of 120 questions to measure the thinking preferences of a person based 
on a “Whole Brain Model” by determining the level of dominance among the four 
thinking structures of the brain.  The four parts of the brain are the left and right 
hemispheres and the limbic/cerebral cortex processes.  HDBI represents the 
Whole Brain as divided into four equal quadrants represented by colors blue, 
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green, yellow, and red.  The quadrants are representative of Hermann’s four 
styles of thinking:  blue is analytical, green is sequential, yellow is imaginative  
and red is interpersonal.  My HDBI Whole Brain Profile indicates I am a left-brain 
(blue, green) dominant thinker.  My right-brain thinking is red then yellow.2
Herrmann International, 2009
  The 
HDBI Whole Brain Model is depicted in Figure 1( ).  
My journey to discover my own self-awareness continued with the concepts 
contained in Dynamics 669, with Dr. James Larkin and the introduction to the 
Enneagram. 
The Enneagram is a system based on nine personality types arranged into 
three categories, referred to as Triads.  The nine personality types are the 
Reformer, the Helper, The Motivator, the Individualist, the Investigator, the 
Loyalist, The Enthusiast, the Leader, and the Peacemaker.  The Triads are 
Feeling, Thinking, and Instinctive.  The exact origins of the Enneagram are 
unknown and “lost to history” (Riso & Hudson, 1996, p. 11).  However, the origins                                                         2 For more on the Hermann Brain Dominance Instrument visit www.hdbi.com. 
Figure 1, HDBI Whole Brain Model  
 
 






of the personality types are not.  The basic personality types have their origin in 
the Judeo-Christian belief of the seven deadly sins (Riso & Hudson, 1996, p. 14). 
Using the Enneagram to evaluate myself, I have determined that my basic 
personality type is the Leader, which is in the Instinctive Triad.  To round out my 
personality in the Feeling Triad my personality type is the Helper and in the 
Thinking Triad it is the Loyalist.  As I understand the Enneagram this means that 
I tend to over express instinct and feelings, and that I am most out of touch with 
thinking (as compared to the other two personality types within the thinking 
Triad).  
When I initially read Riso and Hudson (1996) I found it difficult to identify 
with any of the nine personality types as the one that is my basic type.  However, 
as I read descriptions of healthy, average, and unhealthy types it became clear 
that the Leader is the best fit as a basic personality type.  What led me to that 
conclusion was the description of the average Leader and the unhealthy Leader.  
It is here that I most closely related to the Leader, as I do believe I am a 
pragmatist.  What caught my attention was the description of the unhealthy 
Leader as “hardhearted, immoral, and potentially violent” (Riso & Hudson, 1996, 
p. 298).  This was me as well – the me spiraling out of control as the result of 
mTBI and PTS.  During that time, I was demanding, demeaning, and downright 
frightening to some of the Soldiers that worked for me if they failed to follow my 
directives.  I know this because after I entered treatment and recovered a good 
portion of my cognitive abilities I went back and spoke with a few of the Soldiers 
who worked for me before I was injured in 2006 and then again when I returned 
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home in 2007.  It was through my journey of self-awareness that I rediscovered 
the importance of context. 
I say rediscovered because in the military I had used the memory aid of 
METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain and weather, Troops and support available, 
Time available and Civil considerations) (United States, 2008a, pp. 5-5) during 
mission planning and execution to keep context firmly in mind, to help me and my 
Soldiers visualize the desired end state for the task at hand.   
This visualization process had allowed for a better understanding and a 
way to analyze the unrelated factors of the operational environment by framing 
the circumstances—a skill or habit of thought I seem to have misplaced duringmy 
life directed by PTS.  This framing, or as I used earlier “context”, is how I relate or 
connect complex factors that may not necessarily be related.  My rediscovery of 
context also included learning that context may not be the best method to 
describe this process.   
A better way to describe this process is what Mayo and Nohria (2005) 
describe as “contextual intelligence”(p. xv).   This contextual intelligence allows 
one to comprehend and connect a series of complex factors that may not 
necessarily be related.  I use the word contextualize to represent the use of 
contextual intelligence.  I believe this contextualization is a significant factor in 
the subjective or objective lens selection. 
Characteristically due to contextual intelligence, our contextualization 
process is not a fixed process.  We continually update our framing process based 
on the learning or unlearning that we do.  Growing up in a military family and for 
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most of my adult life living the military culture is an example of this framing 
process.  The lens that I looked through was highly influenced by that military 
culture.  The injury to my brain changed my lens, which then changed the way I 
behaved.  As I healed over time, my lens changed again, leading me to conclude 
that time is another contextual binder. 
We change our lens and view things differently over time.  Again, an 
example is my behavior before injury as opposed to my behavior after injury.  
The same principle applies as we mature, physically, intellectually, and 
emotionally.  Due to the intellectual maturation I have experienced in the MSOD 
program I look at many things differently, and have the ability to recognize when I 
should change my lens.  It is this perspective about my own perspectives that is 
helping to guide development of my capstone project. 
Upon recovering from my PTS experience, through the assistance of a 
mental health provider, I thought as a leader openly discussing what happened to 
me could benefit Soldiers that have yet to acknowledge or seek treatment for 
PTS.  I soon discovered that my peers, as well as leaders at all levels, were 
uncomfortable discussing the subject of PTS and the Soldiers afflicted by it.  I 
found that reaction to be somewhat strange since the month before my 
retirement the Army, in an attempt to relieve the stressors on Soldiers and their 
families, initiated a new program.  Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) and it is 
designed to help prepare Soldiers to “thrive at a cognitive and behavioral level in 
the face of protracted warfare and everyday challenges of Army life that are 
common in the 21st century” (United States Army, 2011).  Senior Army leaders 
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hope implementation of the CSF process will serve to inoculate Soldiers against 
the affects of Post Traumatic Stress, reduce substance abuse often associated 
with it, while also lowering the suicide rate and other high risk behaviors that 
have increased during the ten years of conflict associated with war fighting in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. 
In this “aha” moment I asked myself several questions.  How can a 
program like CSF be effective if the members of the organization cannot openly 
discuss the problem?  What learning can facilitate the acceptance of CSF and 
the removal of the negative bias of seeking mental health services?  Will this new 
learning allow Soldiers and leaders to let go of these old biases or will they need 
to unlearn what they know? 
I chose to examine CSF because it is the program touted to make new 
Soldiers resilient to the effects of stress and to heal current Soldiers already 
affected by it.  My interest in this topic derives from three additional perspectives 
as well.  First is from exposure to the concepts of servant leadership, systems 
thinking, power and politics, and individual and organizational behavior while 
studying for a Masters of Science degree in Organizational Dynamics.  The 
second is from my personal experience of suffering the affects of mild Traumatic 
Brain Injury and the subsequent onset of Post Traumatic Stress (PTS).  The third 
is that, while serving 24 years in the Active Guard Reserve program of the Army 
National Guard I observed several instances of senior leaders mandating a 
change that was unsuccessful due to a lack of bona fide support from lower level 
leaders and Soldiers.  The Army black beret, chosen to symbolize the Army’s 
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transformation, is one such mandate.  Another 21st century example is the non-
acceptance of the Counter Insurgency (COIN) Strategy.  Many leaders believed 
that nation building or winning the hearts and minds of the civilian populace 
would degrade the war-fighting proficiency they worked so hard to build in their 
units.  I chose to use only the beret as an example of failed Army change in the 
remainder of my paper simply due to the explicit nature of the meaning laid out 
by General Shinseki. 
 In 2000, Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric Shinseki, chose the 
wearing of a black beret  “to symbolize the Army's commitment to transforming 
itself into the Objective Force” (United States, 2001).  The Objective Force, 
although not fully defined in 2000, was the Army’s vision of a future force that 
was more mobile, more lethal, more survivable, and capable of operating across 
a wide spectrum of operational environments.  It was a vision designed to shed 
the large formations of the cold war era.  General Shinseki surprised the Army 
community in the fall of 2000 with his memorandum announcing his decision to 
make the black beret the standard Army headwear.  In October of 2000 he 
stated, "Starting next June, the black beret will be symbolic of our commitment to 
transform this magnificent Army into a new force - a strategically responsive 
force for the 21st century.  It will be a symbol of unity, a symbol of Army 
excellence, a symbol of our values.  When we wear the beret, it will say that we, 
the soldiers of the world's best army, are committed to making ourselves even 
better” (Army News Service, 2000).  At that time, Army Rangers wore the black 
beret, with other elite forces of the Army wearing berets.  A maroon beret 
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signifies Airborne Soldiers, and a green beret Army Special Forces Soldiers.  The 
beret, as a symbol, signified “elite”.  In choosing the beret, General Shinseki 
wanted to symbolize that his vision of the Objective Force saw the entire Army as 
elite.  The leaders and Soldiers of the elite (Ranger, Airborne, and Special 
Forces) community did not share his vision. 
In June of 2011, Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John M. McHugh, 
directed that on June 14, 2011 the patrol cap would once again become the 
standard headgear with the Army Combat Uniform.  This directive is the result of 
failed support, from multiple levels within the Army, for a mandated change and 
brings to an end a not-so-loving, decade-long affair with the black beret. 
Purpose  
The purpose of my capstone is to proffer the use of presencing, defined in 
more detail in Chapter 3, to change Army culture.  In order to set forth and 
support my premise, I will examine key cultural biases in the United States Army 
in an attempt to determine how successful the Army’s Comprehensive Soldier 
Fitness (CSF) program may be without implementation of an effective process to 
un-learn the previous cultural biases associated with mental health issues within 
the organization.  I think part of the issue preventing change is that learning 
models currently in use are circular in nature and begin with observation.  I will 
describe these learning cycles in more detail in Chapter 2.  I will posit here how 
two such models, as examples of this type of learning, tend to trap us in the past 
as we observe the actions that derive from our a priori thinking and planning.  
“People in organizations find it very difficult to deal effectively with information 
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that conflicts with their current beliefs and methods.  They do not know how to 
accommodate dissonant information and they find it difficult to change a few 
elements of their interdependent beliefs and methods” (Starbuck, 1996).  The 
proliferation of electronic mail and messaging in the 21st century serves to 
compound the ability to deal with dissonant information.  The rate at which 
organizations accumulate, synthesize, and disseminate information that is useful 
in a changing operational environment is accelerating.  
This acceleration only serves to exacerbate the challenges for successful 
organizational learning and unlearning as well as for the formation of healthy, 
productive organizational culture, making these challenges worthy of continued 
review by business leaders and academics alike.  “Organizational learning and 
unlearning is a popular and important topic in business as well as academia.  
Even though there is a plethora of studies on organizational learning, surprisingly 
little is known about the conceptualization and operationalization of 
organizational unlearning” (Akgün, Byrne, Lynn, & Keskin, 2007). 
Army senior leadership recognizes that organizations unable to quickly 
synthesize and disseminate information to the people who make up the 
organization, and thus allow them to adapt to a changing environment face 
serious challenges of survival.  Without stakeholder buy-in and more importantly 
the ability of the organization, and the people who comprise it, to un-learn the old 
culture and embrace the change, the change is doomed to failure.  In his forward 
to TRADOC PAM 325-8-2, The U.S. Army Learning Concept for 2015, as Chief 
of Staff of the Army, General Martin Dempsey, wrote, “We live in a much more 
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competitive security environment.  This means that we have to learn faster and 
better than our future adversaries do.  Stated a bit differently, we must prevail in 
the competitive learning environment” (United States, 2011b). 
Prevailing in the competitive learning environment entails much more than 
learning.  In order for an organization to transform, to move from its current state 
to a future state, leaders must enact an effective process to manage the change 
and effect the transition of the individuals within it.  Change and transition are not 
the same, according to Bridges in his work, Managing Transitions : Making the 
Most of Change (2003).  “Change is situational: the move to a new site, the 
retirement of the founder…Transition, on the other hand, is psychological; it is a 
three-phase process that people go through as they internalize and come to 
terms with the details of the new situation that change brings about” (2003, p. 4).   
In his work, Theory U: Leading from the Emerging Future, C. Otto 
Scharmer (2007), introduces us to another [this reminds me of Ackoff, so I would 
not want to say new without having to prove it to be new] way of thinking about 
and facilitating change at both a personal and organizational level. 
When I started realizing that the most impressive leaders 
and master practitioners seem to operate from a different core 
process, one that pulls them into future possibilities, I asked myself: 
How can we learn to better sense and connect with a future 
possibility that is seeking to emerge? 
I began to call this operating from the future as it emerges 
“presencing.”  Presencing is a blending of the words “presence” 
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and sensing.”  It means to sense, tune in, and act from one’s 
highest future potential—the future that depends on us to bring it 
into being” (2007, p. 8). 
What Scharmer describes is transformative leadership; the ability to inspire and 
motivate people to do something that is radically different in nature from what 
they would previously consider comfortable doing; and in this case, that 
something is to let go of the past in order to learn and embrace a new future way  
of doing things. 
For Comprehensive Soldier Fitness to be truly effective the Army, the 
Soldiers and leaders who comprise it, must change their current beliefs about  
seeking mental health services.  To accomplish this we will need not only 
transformative (and here I imply self-aware and self-awareness creating) leaders 
but a change in the Army culture as well.  In his work Organizational Culture and 
Leadership, Edgar Schein (2010) writes “When we are influential in shaping the 
behavior and values of others, we think of that as “leadership” and are creating 
the conditions for new culture formation” (p. 3).  He goes on to define culture as it 
pertains to a group as “a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group 
as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which 
has worked well enough to be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems” (Schein, p. 18).  Within 
organizations, he analyses culture on three levels, depicted in Table 1, The 




2 after introducing how the Army defines culture. 
General Casey, former Chief of Staff of the Army, in 2009 wrote “Our 
Army Values and Warrior Ethos play a significant role in how we see ourselves 
and, therefore, in how we choose to behave.  The prevailing view among many 
within our ranks is that having problems with stress or seeking help is not only 
inconsistent with being a warrior but also a sign of weakness.  This way of 
thinking has led to a stigma associated with receiving help and, therefore, an 
aversion across much of the Army to seeking behavioral health care” (G.W. 
Casey Jr., 2011, p. 2).  To change this there must be learning of new knowledge 
about both CSF and mental health.  More importantly, the Army, along with its 
Soldiers and leaders, must let go of the old way of thinking; in other words there 
must be unlearning of the old ways.   
Corporate leaders, as well as military leaders within other branches, can 
make an inference applicable to their own company or branch of service from the 
examination of cultural biases within the Army.  “Individuals alone, no matter how 
competent or charismatic, never have all the assets needed to overcome 
1. Artifacts 
• Visible and feelable structures and process 
• Observed behavior 
• Difficult to decipher 2. Espoused Beliefs and Values 
• Ideals, goals, values, aspirations 
• Ideologies 
• Rationalizations 
• May or may not be congruent with behavior and other artifacts 3. Basic Underlying Assumptions 
• Unconscious, taken-for-granted beliefs and values 
• Determine behavior, perception, thought, and feeling  
(Schein, 2010, p.23)  
Table 1. The Three Levels of Culture 
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tradition and inertia except in very small organizations” (Kotter, 1996, p. 6)  
Organizational change in and of itself is not a singular event.  It involves other 
aspects of leadership and management to facilitate the change.  By focusing on 
unlearning and presencing, I am not implying, or stating, that any of these other 
aspects are less useful or important.  It is my intent only to show that directing a 
change as a senior leader while providing limited information as to the need or 
permission to discuss does not necessarily provide subordinates with the 
knowledge or initiative required for successful implementation.  
Methodology  
In order for me to best illustrate my concern for the future success of 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness as valid, I will compare CSF against a 21st-
century change initiated by Army leadership considered less than successful.  
That change is the decision to use the black beret for all Soldiers as an outward 
symbol of transformation.  This methodology will allow for articulation of the 
problem, identification of means to solve them or for the need to study them 
further. 
To accomplish this I will introduce concepts of organizational change in 
chapter 2 by reviewing literature on the body of knowledge of change 
management, unlearning, and presencing.  Both unlearning and presencing are 
relatively new knowledge areas.  In the case of unlearning, not all academics 
consider continued pursuit in this area as worthy of an academic investigation.  I 
will include opposing academic points of view so as to ensure a rounded review 
that will help shape the reader’s own opinion regarding unlearning.  
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I will also provide a brief overview of how doctrine, culture, and tradition 
shape future thinking of Army leadership.  I will introduce the literature used for 
this while conducting a review of literature in chapter 2. 
In chapter 3, I will discuss the cultural biases that may prevent full buy in 
and implementation of CSF from leaders and Soldiers of the Army.  I will then 
compare implementation of the beret to Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, focusing 
on stakeholder buy in and what it will take for individuals and the organization to 
successfully implement a transition of behavior and culture to ensure the success 
of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. 
I will use the following questions to guide the development of my 
argument. 
1. How can a program like CSF be effective if the members of the 
organization cannot openly recognize or discuss the problem it is designed to 
address? 
2. How can learning help facilitate the acceptance of CSF and the 
removal of the negative bias of seeking mental health treatment?   
3. Will this new learning allow Soldiers and leaders to let go of these 
old biases or will they need to unlearn what they know? 
4. Can unlearning be useful to Army leaders and if so how do we 
implement it in support of organizational and individual behavior? 
5. Are individual changes and transition managed the same way as 
organizational changes and transition? 
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6. Are senior leaders capable of letting go of the past in order to bring 






Doctrine, Culture and Tradition: Shaping the Future Thinking of Army Leadership  
“Doctrine represents a professional army’s collective thinking about how it 
intends to fight, train, equip, and modernize” (United States, 2002, p. iv).  The 
primary method of dissemination is through institutional training and professional 
development throughout the ranks.  Doctrine represents the distillation of 
learning, often difficult, from previous wars and conflicts.  It is equivalent to policy 
in the government or business sense. 
The Vietnam experience of Army senior leaders heavily influenced the 
development and implementation of Army doctrine throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.  “The prevailing view among American military officers and defense 
intellectuals after Vietnam was that counterinsurgency and nation-building 
activities had been a harmful distraction from the military’s pre-eminent mission 
of deterring and preparing to fight the massed conventional forces of the Soviet 
Union or its proxies”, (Fitzsimmons, 2008, p. 350; United States, 2002, p. iv).  
This was evident in the Army’s development of doctrine throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s.   
Known as Air Land Battle, it focused on the use of overwhelming firepower 
to defeat large enemy formations.  The United States used technologically 
advanced weapon systems to offset what it lacked in numbers of personnel and 
equipment.  With the swift victory over Iraqi forces in 1991, the developers of the 
doctrine, and those schooled in the art of its use, were convinced beyond a doubt 
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that years spent training Soldiers to effectively unleash the devastating firepower 
to overwhelm the enemy was correct.  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Army inculcated Air Land Battle into 
current and future Army leaders.  However, this alone, was not the only influence 
on how the Army would train, equip, or fight.  In our system of government, 
civilian leadership has control over the military.  These leaders also influence 
doctrine, culture, and future thinking.  In 2003, then Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, while speaking about operations in Afghanistan stated: 
Afghanistan belongs to the Afghans.  The objective is not to 
engage in what some call nationbuilding.  Rather it's to try to help 
the Afghans so that they can build their own nation.  This is an 
important distinction.  In some nationbuilding exercises well-
intentioned foreigners arrive on the scene, look at the problems and 
say let's fix it.  This is well motivated to be sure, but it can really be 
a disservice in some instances because when foreigners come in 
with international solutions to local problems, if not very careful they 
can create a dependency (Rumsfeld, 2003). 
 These remarks served to bolster the belief of leaders across the Army that lethal 
engagements must remain the focus, and I believe helped shape the current 
doctrine of Full Spectrum Operations, as well as the thinking of the future 
generation of leaders.  
 Full Spectrum Operations is defined as “The Army’s operational concept: 
Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support 
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operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, 
retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to 
achieve decisive results.  They employ synchronized action—lethal and 
nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough understanding 
of all variables of the operational environment.  Mission command that conveys 
intent and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use 
of Army forces” (United States, 2008a, pp. Glossary-7).  Figure 2, Full Spectrum 
Operations, is a graphical representation of integrating the four missions across 
the spectrum of operations (2008b, p. 3-20).  As the Army’s main war fighting 
doctrine of the 21st century, Full Spectrum Operations will also serve to define the 
future culture within the Army. 
 
Culture is another important dynamic within the Army.  The Army defines 
culture as “A shared set of traditions, belief systems and behaviors shaped by 
many factors such as history, religion, ethnic identity, language and nationality 
Figure 2.  Full Spectrum Operations 
(2008b, p. 3-20) 
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which evolves in response to various pressures and influences.  It provides a 
lens through which one sees and understands the world” (United States, 2008b).  
Army Culture is the overarching term I will use to describe the artifacts, espoused 
beliefs and values, and the basic underlying assumptions (Schein, 2010) of 
Soldiers that are not present in civilian society, or possibly other branches of the 
service, and that affect the way we act, think and behave as Soldiers.  
The learning of most Army culture takes place during initial entry training, 
be it basic training as a private newly enlisted or as a Cadet in the Reserve 
Officer Training Corps or at the United States Military Academy.  Soldiers and 
leaders introduction to artifacts, the espoused beliefs, values and the underlying 
assumptions of the Army occurs during initial entry training.  Artifacts include, but 
are not limited to, structure of units within the Army, the unique language, 
uniforms, and customs and courtesies.  
The Army Values and the Warrior Ethos are examples of espoused values 
and beliefs.  An example of the mismatch that exists when actions and behavior 
do not match the espoused values and beliefs is the non-acceptance of the 
beret.  Those Soldiers and leaders that failed to grasp the symbolism intended by 
General Shinseki rationalized the non-acceptance of the beret with the belief that 
not everyone can be elite. Or another example is as I previously mentioned in 
Chapter 1, some leaders rationalized the non-acceptance of COIN strategy with 
the belief that winning of hearts and minds would erode the combat effectiveness 
of Soldiers and units.   
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An example of a basic underlying assumption within the Army is the belief 
that being able to cope with the stress of combat or seeking mental health 
treatment is a sign of individual weakness.  The negative bias of seeking mental 
health treatment holds true for most of society as well.  
Through professional development training a Soldier or leader receives 
training or reinforcement of Army culture.  The Army places the responsibility of 
training on leaders.  Leaders train their units regardless of whether they are 
operational in a war zone, at home station, or participating in an exercise at a 
combat training center. 
  Leader development is deliberate, continuous, and 
progressive, spanning a leader’s entire career.  Leader 
development comprises training and education gained in schools; 
the learning and experiences gained while assigned to 
organizations and the individual’s own self-development.  
The Army leader development model (see Figure 3) 
illustrates how the Army develops competent and confident leaders 
through three mutually supporting training domains.  A training 
domain is a sphere of learning in which unit training and leader 
development activities occur.  The training domains are 
institutional, operational, and self-development (United States, 
2011a, pp. 2-6). 
The institutional Army serves as the knowledge center for the Army.  It 
also develops new doctrine and training requirements for the Army.  In addition to 
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providing training at formal schools, mobile training packages are available upon 
request to help commanders and leaders train their Soldiers at home stations via 
subject matter experts as local instructors or through distance learning.   
 At the heart of the institutional domain is initial military training.  This 
training provided to all new entrants to the Army is what turns civilians into 
Soldiers.  “Initial military training provides the basic knowledge, skills, and 
behaviors individuals need to become Soldiers, succeed as members of Army 
units, contribute to mission accomplishment, and survive and win on the 
battlefield” (United States, 2011a, pp. 2-6).  At the core of this basic knowledge 
are the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos.  The Army Values and Warrior Ethos 
play a significant role in the individual behavior of Soldiers and the formation of 
culture, and cultural biases, within the Army. 
 “The Army Values consist of the principles, standards, and qualities  
considered essential for successful Army leaders.  They are fundamental to 
helping Soldiers and Army civilians make the right decision in any situation” 
Figure 3. Leader Development Model 
(2011a, p. 2-6) 
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(United States, 2006, pp. 4-2). Figure 4, The Army Values, depicts the Army 
values. 
 
In support of his Army transformation plan, General Shinseki stated the 
need for an organizational ethos to bind the spirit of the Army culture and 
community together. 
Every organization has an internal culture and ethos. A true warrior 
ethos must underpin the Army’s enduring traditions and values….  
Soldiers imbued with an ethically grounded warrior ethos clearly 
symbolize the Army’s unwavering commitment to the nation we 
serve.  The Army has always embraced this ethos but the demands 
of Transformation will require a renewed effort to ensure that all 
Soldiers truly understand and embody this warrior ethos (2006, pp. 
4-10). 
The embodiment of todays Army Creed occurs through the Warrior Ethos, listed 
(2006, pp. 2-2) 
Figure 4.  The Army Values 
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in Figure 5. 
 
 With the adoption of Full Spectrum Operations as the 21st century war 
fighting doctrine, nearly ten years of combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the transformation to the Objective Force, the Army has changed.  
Inculcating formal culture through education and training across all three 
domains will help the Army maintain its war fighting advantage and dispel the 
incorrect and informal culture.  At the same time failure of the Army to change the 
beliefs of present leaders serves to promulgate old beliefs and impede continued 
transformation to the Objective Force.  Like the black beret, without cultural 
transformation at all levels the new Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program is 
likely to share the same fate. 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
 
Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is an Army program developed with the 
help of leading social scientists in America.  At the core of CSF is a resiliency 
program developed at the University of Pennsylvania.  Resiliency is the ability of 
a person to recover from adversity, be it physical or emotional.  The goal of 
Figure 5.  Warrior Ethos 
(United States, 2006) 
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Comprehensive Soldier Fitness is to make Soldiers as mentally tough as they are 
physically.  During a planning meeting to develop CSF, General Casey informed 
the group of such by saying, “I want to create an army that is just as 
psychologically fit as it is physically fit.  You are all here to advise me how to go 
about this cultural transformation” (Seligman, 2011, p. 2287). 
CSF begins with the Global Assessment Tool, “a self report questionnaire 
designed to measure the psychosocial well-being of soldiers of all ranks in four 
domains: emotional fitness, social fitness, family fitness and spiritual fitness” 
(Seligman, 2011). Completed on-line a series of questions ask the participant to 
think back over the last four weeks and indicate how they felt or reacted to 
questions from each of the domains.  Inside the emotional fitness module are 
questions designed to identify if the respondent is at risk for PTS.  Dr. Seligman 
refers to these as “catastrophization” items, a cognitive thinking trap…If you 
endorse these items as “very much like me” you are at risk for anxiety, 
depression and PTSD” (Seligman, 2011, p. 2407).  It took me about fifteen 
minutes to complete the GAT.  At the completion of the GAT, I received instant 
feedback, shown in Figure 6, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Feedback.  I am 
also able to compare myself against others in several categories.  Those 
categories are gender, component status3, rank, marital status, civilian education 
level, age, MOS4
                                                        
3 Component status refers to Active Duty, National Guard, Army Reserve, and Retirees, etc. 
, and deployment.  An example of where I stand compared to 
other lieutenant colonels (LTC) is in Figure 7, Comprehensive Soldier Fitness 
Comparison.  Based on my score the system then provides me a series of 





training modules that I can complete on-line that are designed to allow me to 
improve my overall fitness in each of the domains.  What is important to note is 
that my responses remain private and not available to anyone in the chain of 
command.  This practice is to encourage honest participation so that Soldiers 
can help themselves and thereby reduce the need for medical assistance.  It also 
serves the purpose of helping to remove the stigma that exists from seeking help 
for behavioral injuries.  Like any tool, CSF is only as good as those that operate 
Figure 7. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Comparison 
Figure 6. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Feedback 
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it.  Leaders at all levels will need to adapt and accept new knowledge and 
changing management techniques in support of CSF. 
Relevant Concepts of Change Management  
Like stories, personal and organizational transformations require a 
beginning, middle and an end.  However, unlike stories, personal and 
organizational transformation begins at the end and ends at a beginning.  A 
process occurs to get one (be it a person, persons or organization) from a current 
state to a future state.   
 In continuing to describe this process, three words (change, transition, 
and transformation) are interchangeable.  In going forward, I think it important to 
define the words, and discuss how I will use them throughout the remainder of 
this work.  Definitions from The New Oxford American Dictionary (2008):  
Change 
v. 
1 make or become different: [trans.] a proposal to change the law | 





a thorough or dramatic change in form or appearance: its 





the process or a period of changing from one state or condition to 
another: students in transition from one program to another | a 
transition to multiparty democracy 
 
Change refers to a physical state of being and I intend to use the word in 
the situational context, as does Bridges (2003).  Transformation, in the context of 
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personal or organizational transition management, refers to the future state of 
being (what is to be after change and transition).  Transition is the in between 
process of changing from the past state to the future state.  Understanding the 
terms is important because to use them interchangeably creates a false sense 
that the process is moving along in the proper direction and the outcome will be 
successful. 
As I introduced in chapter 1, Bridges (2003) defines change as situational 
and transition as psychological.  The three phases of the psychological transition 
are: 
1. Letting go of the old ways and the old identity people had.  
2. Going through an in-between time when the old is gone 
but the new isn’t fully operational.  We call this time the “neutral 
zone”: it’s when the critical psychological realignments and 
repatternings take place. 
3. Coming out of the transition and making a new beginning.  
(Bridges, 2003, pp. 185-188) 
Bridges (2003) psychological transition, I believe, represents the story of 
personal or organizational transformation.  I view the “letting go” as the 
beginning, the “neutral zone” as the period of transition is the middle, and the 
“coming out” the future state that is the desired transformation represents the 
end. 
  How exactly do we let go of old ways and identities (change) so that we 
develop a new way of thinking (transition) in order to achieve transformation?  Is 
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it simply achieved by learning something new or is there something else 
required?  If there is a something else, what might that be?   
That something else is unlearning.  Just as with change, transition and 
transformation, I think it is important to define “unlearn” before moving forward.  
From The New Oxford American Dictionary (2008): 
Unlearn 
v. 
[trans.] discard (something learned, esp. a bad habit or false or 
outdated information) from one’s memory: teachers are being 
asked to unlearn rigid rules for labeling and placing children. 
 
When it comes to unlearning, I do not think the human brain has the capacity to 
“discard” old data in the traditional sense of the word discard.  What will happen 
is the data will remain stored and during future thought processes be filtered from 
the process.  The essence of unlearning is when the new learned data takes its 
place in order to complete the thought process.  There are emerging studies in 
the field of neuroscience that support my premise.  Specifically, a study focusing 
on how the brain works in early language development, states “learning produces 
neural commitment to the properties of the stimuli we see and hear. Exposure to 
a specific data set alters the brain by establishing neural connections that 
“commit” the brain to processing information in an ideal way for that particular 
input (e.g., one’s first language)” (Bransford, et al., 2006, p. 44).  As we develop 
these neural commitments later serve as filters and have an effect on the way we 
process information. (Bransford, et al., 2006) 
I will also argue here to successfully implement a change requires people 
to learn from a new reference point.  The only way to fully learn from a new point 
is to discard the old point of reference by overwriting it with replacement data.  
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Hedberg (1981) argued “Unlearning is the a process through which learners 
discard knowledge.  Unlearning makes way for new responses and mental maps” 
(1981, p. 18).  Bridges (2003) goes on to assert that a fine line exists between 
new learning and discarding of the old, and if done incorrectly by leadership an 
improper ending sets the stage for a non-existent neutral zone.  “The leaders 
forget endings and neutral zones; they try to start with the final stage of 
transition.  And they can’t see what went wrong” (2003, pp. 185-188)!  So how do 
organizations learn to unlearn? 
Akgün et al (2007) describe four types of unlearning within organizations; 
reinventive, formative, adjustive and operative.  Reinventive unlearning describes 
changes to the current core beliefs and is a change of the strategic direction of 
the organization.  Formative unlearning is using a series of small changes to the 
routine operations of the organization to create a system of new beliefs.  
Formative learning is challenged hen members of the organization refuse or deny 
acceptance of the new beliefs.  Adjustive unlearning uses a series of small 
changes to shift the current structure of knowledge within the organization in an 
effort to change the routines of the organization.  Operative unlearning takes 
place over an extended period by using a series of small changes to the beliefs 
and routines within the organization.  Operative unlearning reinforces the current 
way of thinking within the organization and helps fit the organizational processes 
to the current external environment (2007, pp. 801-804). 
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Unlearning is not merely the opposite of learning; it is an intentional 
replacement of knowledge or information intended to change the beliefs or 
routines within an organization and is necessary in order to learn new things.   
Not all academics recognize unlearning as an independent knowledge 
area.  At the 2009 Danish Leadership Conference, J. Howells, N. Mitev and J. 
Scholderer presented a paper, Forget Organisational Unlearning: A Sceptical 
Look At The Use Of The Concept Of 'Unlearning' In Organisational Analysis, in 
which they argued “Management and organizational research would benefit if 
unlearning were forgotten”, (Howells, Mitev, & Scholderer, 2009, p. 13). 
Their contention is that “organisational unlearning is a simple 
phenomenon compared to organisational learning because there is no empirical 
evidence to show that individual unlearning occurs”, (2009, p. 2).  Hedberg 
(1981) posited that learning in an organization differs from other learning.  I 
contend this also applies to unlearning. 
 The experimental relationships between organizations and 
their environments differ from scientific experiments in at least three 
important ways.  Firstly, organizations’ environments change 
frequently, so different experimental situations replace each other 
over time…Secondly, in contrast to many scientists who, as 
experimenters, consider the environment as given and attempt to 
explore reality without influencing it, organizations as experimenters 
blend adaptive adjustment with manipulative enactment…Thirdly, 
although the paradigm of scientific experimenting assumes that 
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stimuli precede responses and that knowledge and beliefs follow 
from observations of the results of actions…. organizational 
learning may well occur also in situations where beliefs and realities 
are little, if at all, connected,(Hedberg, 1981, pp. 3-4). 
I believe Howells et al have focused their energies on reviewing and 
demonstrating a lack of explicit knowledge.  I contend that a review of the tacit 
knowledge associated with unlearning, although not empirical, will begin to 
provide a necessary framework to support continued study of unlearning, both 
individual and organizational.   
By not continuing to study and observe unlearning, Howells et al can 
continue to assert their claim.  If however there is a continued study of unlearning 
from a perspective of tacit knowledge, then empirical evidence may well be 
established.  Learning and unlearning, as psychodynamic processes, tend to be 
more subjective than objective.  To counter the assertion by Howells and others 
that unlearning is unworthy of continued scientific study, I offer the words of the 
psychiatrist John Nemiah, “Those who reject psychodynamic theory refuse to 
take subjective human psychological experiences as phenomena worthy of 
serious attention and study, and consequently they cannot or will not allow 
themselves to observe them”, (Nemiah, 1990). 
Presencing  
 “Most change and learning methods are based on the Kolb Learning 
Cycle, which suggests a version of the following sequence:  observe, reflect, 
plan, act” (Scharmer, 2007, p. 30).  As with unlearning, I think it is important to 
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include alternatives for learning. An alternative to the Kolb Learning Cycle is the 
Recognition –Primed Decision Model proffered by Gary Klein in his work Sources 
of Power: How People Make Decisions (Klein, 1998).  “The recognition-primed 
decision (RPD) model fuses two processes:  the way decision makers size up the 
situation to recognize which course of action makes sense, and the way they 
evaluate that course of action by imagining it” (1998, p. 24).  
 Different as they may be both methodologies trap us in the past by using 
our experience (learned from the past) as the basis for our planning and action.  
In order to move past this trap we must become aware, and Scharmer describes 
three gestures to the process: “They are: suspension, redirection, letting –go” 
(2007, p.35). 
In order to not operate from the past it is imperative to overcome the old 
internal patterns of thinking and remove the resistance to the process.  
“Resistance is the force that keeps our current state distant and separate from 
our highest future potential” (Scharmer, 2007, p. 245).  Scharmer goes on to 
describe the resistance as enemies and calls them voices: the Voice of 
Judgment (VoJ), the Voice of Cynicism (VoC) and the Voice of Fear (VoF).  I 
view Scharmer’s use of the voices as expanding on the theories of Robert Kegan 
(1994) and Michael Ray (1986). 
 Before moving forward with an explanation of the voices, I think it useful to 
provide background on Kegan’s Subject-Object Theory (1994) to better 
understand Scharmer’s (2007) use of the voices to flow through Theory U.  
Berger, Hasegawa, Hammerman & Kegan maintain there is more to 
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transformation than learning new knowledge or skills.  "New information may add 
to the things a person knows, but transformation changes the way he or she 
knows those things” (2007, p. 1).  A key element in the way Kegan (1994) 
discusses transformation is the way in which he distinguishes between what is 
Subject and what is Object.   
What is Subject, like tacit knowledge, is highly internalized and not easily 
described.  Kegan (1994) wrote “We cannot be responsible for, in control of, or 
reflect upon that which is subject” (p. 32).  What is Object is like explicit 
knowledge, with Kegan writing, “those elements of our knowing or organizing that 
we can reflect on, handle, look at, be responsible for, relate to each other, take 
control of, internalize, assimilate, or otherwise operate upon… We have object; 
we are subject” (p. 32).  Our inability to acknowledge the Subject within each of 
us may tacitly make it more difficult to recognize an emerging inner voice holding 
us back.  
Michael Ray in his book Creativity in Business (1986) describes the VoJ 
as that inner voice that dampens our confidence, dissuades us from taking risk 
and from being able to tap into our creative nature by limiting our curiosity. He 
goes on to write, “ It has been estimated that a normal individual uses only five 
percent of his total capability.  We blame that on VOJ.  If, by silencing the VOJ 
even a bit, you reclaim only an additional five percent of your mental capacity, 
you will double your present efficiency and creativity” (p. 40).  This importance 
that Ray places upon the affect of the VoJ may explain why Scharmer refers to it 
as “the first enemy… that blocks the gate to the open mind” (Scharmer, 2007, p. 
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42).  Suppressing the VoJ begins to unchain our thought process from the past. 
As human beings, we are creatures of habit, relying on what worked in the 
past to formulate our actions in the present.  To transform we must suspend our 
old habits so that we do not remain trapped by our experiences and make 
judgments based solely from this point of view.  To be able to embody the new 
culture or behavior and function through an open mind, we must overcome the 
Voice of Judgment (VoJ).  Failing to overcome the VoJ keeps us trapped in the 
mental processes of the old ways, which in turn prevents us from moving forward 
in ways that are more creative.  It is also important that we view the process as a 
process by taking a systemic view that allows us to see how our own actions 
affect the problem as well as the solution.  We can accomplish this by redirecting 
our attention from the Object to the Subject by beginning to believe in and to trust 
our inner self.  In doing so we may be taking a first step in objectively changing 
our lens and become more aware of our own cynicism. 
VoC is the enemy that blocks the gate to the open heart.  The VoC is the 
internal process, which prevents an emotional connection or attachment.  Driven 
by our want to be invulnerable prevents us from moving towards the bottom of 
the U.  The VoC stops us from moving to the surrounding fields through 
arrogance or callousness; the emotions of disconnection (Scharmer, 2007). 
Overcoming the VoC opens our heart and allows our emotions to influence our 
creativity. 
In order to begin to let-go and see an emerging future we must face the 
enemy blocking the gate to the open will, our VoF.  From here, one must 
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transition through the letting-go to the letting-come.  This is the space that 
Scharmer labels presencing.  The VoF prevents us from letting go of the old, 
comfortable thoughts and patterns of action.  It also is a fear of the unknown, and 
that prevents us from moving toward the emerging future (Scharmer, 2007). 
 To aid in this transition Scharmer identifies seven cognitive spaces of 
attention:  
Downloading: reenacting patterns of the past—viewing the 
world through one’s habits of thought 
 
Seeing: suspending judgment and seeing reality with fresh 
eyes—the observed system is separate from those who observe 
 
Sensing: connecting to the field and attending to the 
situation from the whole—the boundary between observer and 
observed collapses, the system begins to see itself  
 
Presencing: connecting to the deepest source, from which 
the field of the future begins to arise—viewing from source 
 
Crystallizing vision and intention—envisioning the new 
from the future that wants to emerge 
 
Prototyping living microcosms in order to explore the future 
by doing—enacting the new through” being in dialogue with the 
universe” 
 
Performing and embodying the new in practices and 
infrastructures—embedding the new in the context of the larger 
co-evolving ecosystems, (2007, p.39). 
 
The cognitive spaces of downloading, seeing and sensing help to clarify 
the suspending, redirecting and letting-go process that takes place on the left 
side of the U.  Rising along the right side of the U are the corresponding 
processes of letting-come, enacting and embodying.   
   Letting go on the down side of the U turns into letting-come on the right 
side (rising side of the U) and serves to clarify the cognitive space of crystallizing 
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vision and intention.  Redirecting from the left corresponds to enacting on the 
right where prototyping of the thoughts to action begins to take shape.  
Suspending on the left corresponds to embodying on the right where the 
cognitive space allows the new behaviors to become part of the culture resulting 
in a transformed self or organization.  
 Visualizing this process may help make it easier to understand.  Figure 8, 
Theory U (Scharmer, 2011) helps achieve that visualization.  “In many ways  
presencing resembles sensing.  Both involve shifting the place of perception from 
the interior to the exterior of one’s (physical) organization.  The key difference is 
that sensing shifts the place of perception to the current whole while presencing 
shifts the place of perception to the source of an emerging future whole – to a 
future possibility that is seeking to emerge” (Scharmer, 2007, p. 30). “When such 
a process of profound innovation and change happens, you can watch a group 
going through some version of the following subtle shifts of the social field” 
(Scharmer, 2007, p. 39). 
Figure 8. Theory U 
This work is licensed by the Presencing Institute - Otto Scharmer, 
www.presencing.com/permissions.  Used with permission. 
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Knowledge and Information  
Key aspects linking learning, unlearning and presencing are information 
and knowledge and how people and organizations create and process it.  
“Deeply ingrained in the traditions of Western management, from Frederick 
Taylor to Herbert Simon, is a view of the organization as a machine for 
information processing.  According to this view, the only useful knowledge is 
formal and systematic – hard (read: quantifiable) data, codified procedures, and 
universal principles.  And the key metrics for measuring the value of new 
knowledge are similarly hard and quantifiable – increased efficiency, lower costs, 
improved return on investment” (Nonaka, 2007, p. 163). 
Understanding how the creation and management of knowledge in an 
organization is crucial to understanding the transformative power of unlearning 
and presencing.  “New knowledge always begins with the individual”, (2007, p. 
164). “Although organizational learning occurs through individuals, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that organizational learning is nothing but the cumulative 
result of their members’ learning” (Hedberg, 1981, p. 6).  For an organization to 
learn, leaders within the organization must create an environment that allows the 
individual to develop the knowledge as well as a framework for the sharing of that 
knowledge throughout the organization. 
  There are two types of knowledge, explicit and tacit.  Explicit knowledge 
is knowledge that we can prove; quantifiable data, codified procedures or 
universal principles.  “Tacit knowledge is highly personal.  It is hard to formalize 
and, therefore, difficult to communicate to others” (2007, p. 165).  Tacit 
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knowledge may well be the key element responsible for modifying culture and 
behavior that is so essential in the transformation process. 
Summary  In Chapter 2, I have provided information on several seemingly unrelated 
topics and will now try to relate these concepts, to contextualize for you my 
purpose in providing them.  Taken together they are viewed as either a set of 
complicated data points or a complex intertwined system.  It is my hope that you 
recognize them as a complex intertwined system. 
 The United States Army inculcates Soldiers and leaders with knowledge of 
the doctrine, artifacts and espoused beliefs unique to the organization of.  This 
knowledge shapes not only the individual beliefs but also serves to effect the 
culture of the organization as a whole.  Also inherent within the organization of 
the Army are underlying assumptions on how a Soldier or leader is to think, act 
or behave.  It is the underlying assumptions related to CSF, like those related to 
General Shinseki’s vision of transformation and the wearing of the black beret, 
that I see will prevent success.   
 In order to overcome these underlying assumptions the Soldiers, leaders 
and the Army as an organization will need to do more than change, they will 
need to transform.  I believe that for an individual or an organization to transform 
there must be transformative leadership, and that requires the teaching and 
development of transformative leaders.  I see transformative leadership as a 
radical departure from the current Army culture.  By providing the information on 
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concepts of management I am attempting to lay the framework to demonstrate 
that presencing is a solution for the development of transformative leaders. 
 I believe we are already using presencing.  As leaders, we rely on more 
than our experience.  We have all developed intuition or a sixth sense and 
experience them as a gut feeling or an inner voice.  These inner voices derived 
from our cultural development are reflective of our own moral compass.  I think 
presencing is a process that helps think through the complexity of intertwined 
concepts and will bring the use of these voices to an open and acceptable part of 
our decision and learning cycles. 
 In Chapter 3, I provide examples of these concepts5
  
 in action. 
                                                        5 Will the use of presencing enable us to anticipate future war and recognize lessons learned but 
not yet experienced?  This is a concept that has emerged from my review of the literature that is 
worthy of further pursuit.  To fully explore this subject, I think, requires a work all its own and I will 






Cultural Biases   
I agree with General Casey’s comments that there is a stigma in the Army 
associated with seeking mental health services and that stigma has created a 
barrier for many Soldiers and leaders to seek treatment.  I disagree however with 
his implication that the “prevailing view” is a result of the Army Values or Warrior 
Ethos.  The Army Values and Warrior ethos provide Soldiers with the ideology of 
what it means to be a Soldier, which Schein categorizes as Espoused Beliefs 
and Values.  
I think the prevailing view represents an improper rationalization of the 
Army’s espoused beliefs and values making them incongruent with the 
organizational behavior.  They are the informal cultural biases that have 
flourished about the meaning of the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos.  This 
rationalization is nothing more than a lens used by us to view non-conforming 
behavior.  Most of these biases become ingrained before Army service.  Our 
American culture as a whole has issues with seeking mental health services or 
dealing with those that do.  Specifically on PTS and the possible biases within 
both our civil and Army cultures I have previously written: 
If we do consider PTS purely as a disorder of the mind, then 
centuries of cultural bias weigh us down in attempts to treat it 
among those who are and still wish to be seen as brave, strong, 
and competent.  As a culture we have a negative mind set towards 
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mental illness for several reasons.  First, before the age of 
enlightenment, mental illness was looked upon as possession by 
the devil.  Second, during the mid-to-late 1800s, gentlemen of 
culture were being cloistered away in back rooms of mental 
hospitals around the world, suffering the late-term effects of 
syphilitic insanity, referred to at the time as “the pox” -- Italian, 
French, or English depending on country of origin (Seligman, 
1995).  Society came to associate the mental condition with the 
character flaw of being with women of ill repute.  Even after science 
proved the cause of the disease was an invading microorganism, 
society did not let go of this puritanical view.  PTS is not the result 
of a character flaw or of having low moral values.  Trauma, be it 
physical or emotional, causes a reaction in the brain that alters it 
from the norm (Hostrander, 2011, p. 3).  
Immersion into the Army culture only serves to amplify these preconceived 
biases in relationship to the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos.  Continued 
improper rationalization of the espoused values and behavior manifested by 
leaders also continues to amplify these informal biases.  I have witnessed this 
improper rationalization take place several times while deployed to Afghanistan.  
A Soldier suffering the effects of stress presents to leadership and identifies 
himself as having trouble and in need of help.  The leader promptly relieves the 
Soldier of his weapon and then segregates him from his squad.  This approach 
serves to not only publicly identify this Soldier is in need of help, but also serves 
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to ostracize him from those he is closet to that can be of the most help.  This act 
of segregating the Soldier and relieving him of his weapon is just one example of 
the improper rationalization that not only prevents Soldiers from asking for help 
but also is what I see as preventing the total acceptance of the Comprehensive 
Soldier Fitness program within the ranks of the Army.  The failure of CSF, much 
as the failure of the beret, will in my opinion take years.  How then can this 
program be effective? 
For CSF to become an effective program there must be a combination of 
unlearning of the old biases and learning of the new, replacement culture -- a 
transformation of individual and organizational behavior.  An effective method to 
accomplish this transformation may be the use of reinventive unlearning where 
by the senior Army leaders describe the current beliefs and then announce 
changes they believe are necessary to those current core beliefs in order to set a 
new strategic direction for the Army. 
To realize this vision of change an additional series of small changes to 
the routine operations that support the creation of the new core beliefs, the use of 
the formative learning process is required.  In the case of CSF, implementation of 
the Global Assessment Tool, which requires each Soldier and leader to complete 
an on-line questionnaire on an annual basis, is one of the small changes to the 
routine of the Army to aide in the creation of the new belief system.  The GAT 
assesses the psychological health of the individual and even provides feedback 
to help the individual Soldier or leader improve.  It is during this period that 
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resistance to the change may occur when Soldiers or leaders refuse or deny 
acceptance of the new belief system. 
This refusal or denial may manifest itself in something as simple as failing 
to complete the GAT until directed by an immediate supervisor or speaking 
negatively of having to tolerate an assessment based on emotions more than 
actions.  These small things done by large numbers of the Army may serve to 
continue the informal cultural biases of seeking mental health services by 
Soldiers and leaders in need of such services.  Leaders openly discussing, in a 
positive way, the benefits of being mentally fit for the individual, the unit, and the 
Army, may overcome this bias.  Implementing an adjustive unlearning process in 
the Army’s institutional domain can counter the resistance of formative 
unlearning.  By formalizing the new knowledge in the individual development 
process, the Army could have inculcated the new knowledge across a broad 
spectrum of Soldiers and leaders.   
For new Soldiers and leaders this inculcation of new knowledge would 
take place during initial entry training.  For non commissioned officers and 
officers, this learning would take place during professional development courses.  
Teaching the new knowledge formally through the institutional domain, each of 
the Soldiers and leaders that completed the training and returned to the unit 
would be implementing an operative unlearning process implementing the 
processes learned in training.  It is my belief that failing to effectively counter the 
resistance that surfaced during the formative unlearning process is where the 
implementation of the beret failed. 
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General Shinseki was looking to transform the strategic direction as well 
as the core beliefs, the culture, of the Army.  In an effort to provide an outwardly 
visible sign of this transformation process, he chose the date of June 14, the 
Army’s birthday, as the date to hold a ceremony to switch to the beret.   
General Shinseki used the ceremony and the beret to mark, as the 
physical state of being, the beginning of the transformation process to take 
Soldiers into the transitional phase by providing a new identity.  After ten years, it 
is clear that the organization did not come out of the transition with the new 
identity envisioned by General Shinseki.  From my own observation and 
perspective, having served from 2001 through 2009, I am uncertain if there was 
enough letting go and acceptance of the new identity within the Army to allow 
entry into the neutral zone.  I posit here that the breakdown was a result of 
doctrine and culture.  I will also put forth that events of September 11, 2001 may 
play a part in the development of doctrine and culture through out this period.  To 
what extent I will leave to others, as that is a subject worthy of an entire paper; I 
will stop at it has played a part.  I will say that I do not think the outcome for the 
beret would be different had we not engaged in a war on terror. 
 The current senior leadership of the Army recognizes the need to learn 
and that change is critical to future success.  The stated purpose in the recently 
published U.S. Army Learning Concept 2015 (United States, 2011b) is  
The U.S. Army’s competitive advantage directly relates to its 
capacity to learn faster and adapt more quickly than its adversaries.  
The current pace of technological change increases the Army’s 
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challenge to maintain the edge over potential adversaries.  In the 
highly competitive global learning environment where technology 
provides all players nearly ubiquitous access to information, the 
Army cannot risk failure through complacency, lack of imagination, 
or resistance to change.  Outpacing adversaries is essential to 
maintain the Army’s global status and to fulfill its responsibilities to 
the nation.  The current Army individual learning model is 
inadequate to meet this challenge.  The Army must take immediate 
action to develop a capacity for accelerated learning that extends 
from organizational levels of learning to the individual Soldier 
whose knowledge, skills, and abilities are tested in the most 
unforgiving environments (p. 5). 
This approach focuses on the change but not the transition process necessary to 
bring about a shift in organizational behavior or culture that achieves 
transformation.   
A process to shift the strategic direction and core beliefs must include a 
process designed to change the behavior of individuals as well as the 
organization to which they belong by providing new knowledge and beliefs as 
well as an unlearning of the old knowledge and beliefs to achieve the 
transformation.  Bridges (2003) process produces organizational change and I 
believe works at the organizational level but not on an individual level.  It also 
relies on a clear vision from the beginning of the transformation process.  As 
Kegan (Berger, et al., 2007) asserts, it is necessary to not only change what we 
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know, but our understanding of how we know it.  Scharmer’s Theory U is a 
dynamic process that will unlock our mind, our heart, and our will allowing us to 
see and experience an emerging future. 
In order to accomplish this transformative change in the most expeditious 
manner, a change in the institutional training domain would seem to be the way 
to garner the largest shift to knowledge in the shortest amount of time.  To shift 
knowledge, a combination of learning and unlearning would need to take place.  
By using the institutional domain, the newest entrants to the Army would learn 
this new way without having to unlearn any of the old ways within the Army.  
They would only be subjected to the Army cultural bias of their trainers and, once 
assigned to a unit, the Army cultural biases of their fellow Soldiers and leaders. 
For Soldiers and leaders attending the continuing development courses 
within the institutional domain the focus would be more towards unlearning the 
old way in order to learn the knowledge of the new way.  By implementing the 
changes via the institutional domain and on those Soldiers and leaders attending 
development courses the formative unlearning process can begin to take shape.   
The developers of the continuing education courses will need to ensure 
that as they develop and implement the small changes intended to transform the 
routine operations within the Army that ways to recognize the refusal or denial of 
the acceptance of the new knew knowledge is present.  As these Soldiers and 
leaders exit the institutional training domain and return to units, the operative 
unlearning process will begin to take root, instituting change within the Army. 
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Since the time of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, man has recognized 
that change is the only constant in life.  We like to think we embrace it, yet we so 
often find ourselves resisting it.  In looking deeper into change, both personal and 
organizational, I have come to refine my thinking on this subject.  I think we 
embrace change and resist transformation, and this is the cause of so many 
failed attempts to move people or organizations forward.  Our resistance to 
transformation lies in the neutral zone or at the bottom of the U.  Our inability to 
“let go” inhibits our ability to “let come” hence, we never step into the future state 
of being.  To transform an organization requires a leader using a transformative 
leadership style; Theory U is one such style. 
Transforming Leadership, Making a Case for Theory U 
 
  I think in making my case for teaching presencing in the Army it is 
important to define what I do not intend presencing to be.  I do not intend it to be 
a problem solving or decision-making rubric to replace the current seven-step 
problem solving process or the eleven-step Military Decision Making Process that 
are currently in use.  I view presencing as a critical thinking process.  A process 
that when used will enhance the problem solving and decision making rubrics 
currently in use in todays Army by removing the barriers within us; our Voices of 
Judgment, Cynicism and Fear.  It can serve to modify the behavior of individuals 
and the organization as a whole, which is truly transformational. 
It will take more than changing the equipment, formations, or fighting 
doctrine to change the way people think, act, or behave.  This is why reliance on 
either the Kolb Learning Cycle or Recognition-Primed Decision Making 
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processes, which trap us in the past by relying on our experiences as we 
formulate future action, will not be sufficient to change the organization.  It will 
take a new way of thinking, and I submit that one way of thinking is presencing. 
 Presencing will allow the Army to transform to meet the demands of the 
21st century and beyond by teaching acceptance, belief and reliance on ones 
emotional, intellectual and spiritual intelligence.  It will change our focus from 
what is the Object to what is the Subject and allow us to not only know something 






General Shinseki set out to transform the Army in 2000.  In looking at the 
changes in the Army over the last decade it is clear the Army has changed.  
Army culture has not changed.  Soldiers and leaders still think and act in much 
the same way as they did before transformation.  As I was reading over my notes 
from a meeting with my advisor, Professor John Eldred, something he stated 
jumped out at me.  “Any model for change in the Army has to be judged by two 
things.  One, how effective instrumentally is it; does it get the change done in the 
future?  Two, is it appreciatively effective; does the model build on the current 
value system of the organization” (Eldred, 2011)?  How does this apply to the 
example of the beret or CSF? 
 In examining General Shinseki’s vision of transformation, I concluded it 
was partially effective both instrumentally and appreciatively.  Today’s Army is 
smaller, more mobile, and more lethal.  Doctrine on war fighting now includes 
tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to operations conducted under 
Full Spectrum Operations and the Army culture is now inclusive of seven values 
as well as a warrior ethos.  However, a large part of Army culture remains 
unchanged.  This, in my opinion, is the result of the inability to counter the 
resistance to formative unlearning that is inherent in transformation, as well as to 
counter the underlying assumptions found in the informal cultural training or 
reinforcement of the bias that takes place in organizations.  Much of this 
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accomplishment occurred as the result of change and transition; transformation 
did not fully occur.   
In the case of CSF I believe it is too early in the program to determine if it 
succeeds or fails.  Like the beret, it may take ten years to determine if todays 
leaders (the leaders of tomorrow) really buy into the program.  Unlike the beret, 
CSF requires a change to the way Soldiers, leaders and the organization think 
and behave towards those with non-visible wounds to the physical brain or to our 
emotions.  I do think that training leaders in presencing will increase the 
probability of success.  
Senior leaders must reinforce this training through their demonstrated 
behavior.  This will require senior leaders, especially those suffering from PTS, to 
set an example and speak out publicly.  This will serve to diminish the stigma of 
public shame of dealing with a behavioral issue, which may serve to eventually 
bring acceptance that injury to our emotions during war is just as real and in need 
of treatment as our physical injuries.  It may help those speaking openly of their 
PTS experience to speak about it indirectly, using a metaphor. 
 I have used the metaphor of the lens in my paper to describe a filtering 
process that we use to view, filter, and process information.  We also use it to 
determine how we choose to view ourselves.  The lens is not only for viewing 
how we see things, but also projects outwardly how we want others to perceive, 
or view, us; like the lens of a movie projector.  Just as the projector pushes the 
picture out onto the big screen, we project out our ideas and biases onto others.  
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They remove our projected biases through how they choose to use their lens to 
filter our output. 
In going a step further, I can call three of the filters Sharmer’s (2007) 
Voices: Voices of Judgment, Cynicism, and Fear.  We use these filters to 
process what we view through our lens, how we internalize our self-view, and 
how we project ourselves onto others.  In addition to the lens metaphor I also 
mentioned in my introduction that as part of the MSOD program I have learned 
that context also matters.  We not only have the lens to view and project through; 
we have to understand the contextualization of how we use it.  In the case of 
Army culture the contextualization may include things such as the Army Values, 
Warrior Ethos, or the political, economic, and social factors of the time.  When we 
combine our Voices, the Army Values and the Warrior Ethos to re-examine 
General Shinseki’s vision for transformation I think we may get a better 
understanding for the need to develop transformative leaders.  
Our Voices, the Army Values, and the Warrior Ethos together form a 
complex system in which to operate.  Presencing can help most in dealing with 
this complexity.  By overcoming our Voices, we are less judgmental, cynical, and 
fearful of our own internal vision of our self as well as of our projection of our self 
and our ideas to others.  This allows us to see more than a complicated view of 
the process of dealing with our Voices, Values, Ethos, and environment as a set 
of many connected parts.  It allows us to view the complexity of the system and 
the interconnectedness of the parts to the whole.  Dealing with complexity is what 
sets presencing apart from the Kolb Learning Cycle or the Recognition-Primed 
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Decision Model.  As applied to General Shinseki’s vision of transformation, the 
Army spent ten years focusing on the complicated process of changing the 
individual pieces of doctrine, formation, equipment and size of the organization 
instead of the complex task of transforming the culture.  Without changing the 
way Soldiers and leaders think the Army will never transform, only continue to 
change.  “He was changing what was on the head but not in the head…or the 
heart” (Greco, 2012)! 
Continued learning under the Kolb Learning Cycle and thinking with the 
Recognition-Primed Decision Model will not allow Soldiers and leaders to expose 
and conquer their inner voices.  The future cannot emerge while we remain in the 
past.  Changing the way Soldiers and Leaders think and behave, the Army 
culture, is vital to the success of Comprehensive Soldier Fitness.  To have 
transformative leadership means we must develop transformative leaders and 
presencing is a mechanism to do just that.  Unless there is a change to the Army 
Culture, the Army, as an organization, will always be in transition with 
transformation a temporary vision of a future state achieved only fleetingly on the 
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